The steady rise of income inequality in the United States coincides with trade union decline and structural changes to the economy, but prior studies do not consider whether these phenomena interact in ways that magnify inequality. Drawing on institutional and market accounts of inequality, the author develops the argument that trade union decline, occurring within the context of deindustrialization and the offshoring of routine-manufacturing jobs, creates more profound distributional effects than these factors would create in isolation. This argument is tested (net of other important determinants of income inequality) using timeseries regression models and national-level data from 1947 to 2015. Results support the proposed interaction effects, suggesting that a thorough understanding of inequality and social stratification must consider not only institutions and markets, but how they interact. The results also suggest that inequality is driven by financialization, public sector retrenchment, and unemployment, but not necessarily by technological change.
INTRODUCTION
This study examines rising income inequality in the United States within the context of trade union decline and structural changes to the economy. During the post-war era, the distribution of income in the United States was relatively stable and egalitarian. The Gini coefficient of income inequality, estimated by the US Census Bureau (2017a) annually since 1947, changed little during this period, reaching a nadir of 34.8 in 1968. Since then, it has moved steadily upward, breaking an all-time high of 45.5 in 2013 (see Figure 1 ). These aggregate distributional changes clearly affect core sociological concerns, especially those regarding social stratification and mobility.
How can we explain these pronounced distributional changes?
Institutional accounts undertaken by sociologists emphasize the demise of organized labor (Jacobs & Myers 2014; Kristal 2013; Volscho 2007; Wallace, Leicht, & Raffalovich 1999; Western & Rosenfeld 2011) . Indeed, over the period in question, the US labor movement weakened considerably from its post-war peak, with the unionized portion of the US workforce declining by more than one half (Rosenfeld 2014 ; Chapter 1). Additionally, trade unions lost power due to the breakdown of the labor-capital accord (Rosenfeld 2014) , the rise of neoliberalism and the curtailment of public sector employment (Jacobs & Myers 2014; Volscho 2007) , and the onset of the Information Revolution (Kristal 2013; Kristal & Cohen 2015; Nelson 2001 ). Yet, despite being the focus of early accounts of rising inequality (Bluestone & Harrison 1982) , the ongoing contraction of the industrial sector and the related phenomenon of heightened capital mobility receive less attention.
By contrast, market accounts of rising inequality (especially those favored by economists) emphasize technological change associated with the Information Revolution and how it favors the pecuniary interests of high-skilled workers (Autor 2014; Autor, Katz, & Krueger 1998; Autor, Levy, Murnane 2003; Goldin & Katz 2008) . Sociologists make similar claims, arguing that recent technological change widens wage dispersion among workers with different skills (Liu & Grusky 2013) and heightens the remuneration of capital over labor more generally (Kristal 2013) .
Sociologists also argue that deindustrialization, corporate restructuring, and flexible employment practices harm those toward the bottom of the income distribution (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson 2000; Massey & Hirst 1998) . Of particular concern is growth in "precarious" employment (Kalleberg 2009 (Kalleberg , 2011 characterized by low pay, temporary or part-time contracts, and the absence of clear paths for career advancement (Massey & Hirst 1998) .
In this article, I draw on both institutional and market accounts of inequality to explain trends in the US income distribution since 1947. My general argument is that trade union decline, occurring within the context of deindustrialization and the offshoring of routine manufacturing jobs, creates larger distributional effects than these factors would in isolation. More specifically, I stress that employment opportunities for less-skilled Americans have shifted away from unionized jobs in the industrial sector (high-wage, secure employment) toward non-unionized jobs in the service sector (low-wage, insecure employment).
However, this economic transformation not only reduces the prevalence of good unionized jobs, but weakens the bargaining power of trade unions more generally.
The combined effect, I contend, drives income inequality substantially upward. To test such an argument requires the use of an interaction term between trade union density and measures of structural economic change. To my knowledge, this has not been done.
In what follows, I review the literature on institutional and market accounts of income inequality and develop my argument about how trade union decline interacts with deindustrialization and the offshoring of routine-production jobs to push inequality higher. Next, I advance arguments about how neoliberalism alters macroeconomic policy in ways that heighten inequality, how financialization widens inequality, and how the distributional effects of technological change may be overstated. Then, using time-series data on the US political economy from 1947 to 2015, I test these arguments with first-difference regression models assessing change in the Gini coefficient as well as change in the income ratios between various percentiles of the income distribution-namely the 95 th /20 th , the 95 th /50 th , and the 50 th /20 th . The results support my argument about the proposed interaction effects between deunionization and structural economic change, but highlight important differences in how structural change affects different parts of the income distribution. The study concludes by discussing whether these results might hold in other advanced capitalist countries.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
TRADE UNION DECLINE, DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, AND RISING INCOME INEQUALITY

1. Trade Union Decline
A prominent sociological perspective on distributional conflicts emphasizes the importance of organized labor for generating outcomes favorable to workers.
As articulated by Korpi (1983 Korpi ( , 2006 , firms and workers possess different types of "power resources," which they use to bend market allocations of income in their favor. In labor markets, dominant firms are structurally advantaged by their strict control over enormous economic assets. This constitutes their key power resource, because it gives them bargaining power over lone workers when setting wages and working conditions. Workers, however, can redress this power imbalance through collective action. This constitutes their main power resource.
Trade unions are notable in this regard. The lone worker must accept the prevailing wage, even if that wage is depressed by the considerable bargaining power of dominant firms. But large groups of workers, acting in a coordinated fashion, generate their own bargaining power, which can be used to improve wages and working conditions. This is accomplished through collective bargaining and other forms of collective action.
The positive effects of trade unions for workers are well documented. Studies suggest that unions help workers to earn higher wages (Rosenfeld 2014: 68-73) and to reduce wage inequality among unionized and nonunionized workers alike (Rosenfeld 2014: 74-79; Western & Rosenfeld 2011) . Other studies show that unions accelerate real wage growth (Kollmeyer 2017) , boost labor's share of national income (Kristal 2013; Wallace, Leicht, Raffalovich 1999) , and reduce general levels of income inequality (Jacobs & Myers 2014; Kwon 2016; Moller, Alderson, & Nielsen 2009) . They also lessen incidences of working poverty (Brady, Baker, & Finnigan 2013) . However, in terms of wages, it appears that middleincome workers benefit more from unionization than lower-income workers (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux 2009: 962-966) .
Despite the well-documented ways trade unions benefit workers, the American labor movement has been losing strength for decades (Rosenfeld 2014;  Chapter 1). Even at its peak, organized labor in the United States was relatively weak compared to its counterparts in other affluent democracies, although union membership and collective bargaining in the industrial sector were always widespread. Now, after decades of decline, the American labor movement is particularly feeble, with only 10 percent of the US workforce being unionized (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). In a wide-ranging study of deunionization and its effect on American society, Rosenfeld (2014) concludes that the weakened state of US trade unions prevents them from functioning as a power resource for American workers. The United States, in his words, lost one of its key "equalizing institutions." Importantly, for my study, I expect the decline of organized labor to play a key role in rising income inequality in the United States.
By contrast, there is a less sanguine view of trade unionism, which is influential in economics and political economy but not in sociology. Sometimes called insider-outsider theory or monopoly-union model, this view depicts trade unions as special interest groups seeking to advance the narrow interests of their members (Carruth & Oswald 1987; Freeman & Medoff 1984; Rueda 2007 ). More specifically, trade unions are conceptualized as "rent-seeking" cartels, which use collective action to push wages above equilibrium rates. This clearly benefits unionized workers via higher wages, but may harm other members of society by spurring inflation, slowing job creation, and reducing economic growth. If this occurs, trade union members are immune to these externalities (since they enjoy relatively secure employment with above-market wages), but non-unionized workers and people outside of the labor market are not. Consequently, trade unionism can create an insider-outsider distributional logic, which according to Rueda (2007) , often cuts across the working class, separating the political interests of working-class insiders from working-class outsiders.
Interestingly, this view of trade unionism resonates with the dual labor market perspective developed in sociology. This perspective conceptualizes the US economy (especially during the post-war era) as comprising primary and secondary labor markets (e.g. Tolbert 1978; Sakamoto & Chen 1991) . Workers in the primary labor market presumably enjoy stable employment, high pay, internal job ladders, and unionization (especially for blue-collar workers), but these advantages are reinforced by social and institutional barriers that impede workers in the secondary labor market from competing for available jobs.
For my study, both the insider-outsider perspective and dual labor-market perspective suggest that trade unions may widen inequality between those in the middle and bottom of the income distribution. If this is true, organized labor may (inadvertently) reproduce or even exacerbate inequality. I test this idea in Section 5 by examining how changes in trade union density affect changes in the ratio between the median and 20 th percentile of the income distribution.
Deindustrialization
Affecting blue-collar workers in particular, deindustrialization and the concomitant rise of the service sector are thought to heighten income inequality.
In the latter half of the 20th century, social scientists began predicting the arrival of a post-industrial society, in which economic activity would center on the provision of services rather than the production of physical goods (Clark 1957; Bell 1973) . Indeed, as these scholars predicted, employment in the industrial sector fell from around 40 percent of the US workforce during the post-war era to just over 13 percent today (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017a). This phenomenongenerally known as deindustrialization-is linked to internal changes typically experienced by advanced economies and to the business practice of offshoring routine-manufacturing jobs to less developed countries (LDCs) (Kollmeyer 2009 ).
Regarding its distributional effects, the main contention is that deindustrialization systematically degrades the labor market opportunities of lessskilled workers (Bluestone & Harrison 1982) . During the post-war era, a thriving industrial economy provided relatively high-paying jobs for less-skilled workers.
This was made possible due to the US industrial sector's high productivity levels, heavily unionized workforce, and dominant position within international markets.
However, for less-skilled workers, the onset of deindustrialization upended this advantageous situation by shifting employment opportunities away from well-paid unionized jobs in the industrial sector toward low-paid non-unionized jobs in the service sector.
As Kalleberg and his colleagues (2000) note, many jobs created in the wake of deindustrialization and corporate restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s were "bad jobs." These are jobs with temporary or part-time contracts and low-pay and few fringe benefits, making them poor substitutes for erstwhile industrial employment (see also Kalleberg 2009 Kalleberg , 2011 . Indeed, research shows that deindustrialization and service sector expansion are associated with falling median earnings (Lorence 1991) and rising earnings inequality (Lorence & Nelson 1993; Wallace, Gauchat & Fullerton 2011) . However, the proliferation of "bad jobs" is only part of the story, because service sector expansion creates a post-industrial dualism, characterized by bifurcation between high-wage producer services and low-wage personal services (see Kwon 2016; Moller & Rubin 2008) .
A related phenomenon is the global reorganization of basic manufacturing activities. Starting in 1970s, US manufacturing firms and their competitors in other advanced economies began offshoring the bulk of their routine-production tasks to LDCs (see Harrison & Bluestone, 1988: Chapter 2; Kollmeyer 2009; Wood 1994 ).
This process fundamentally changed the longstanding international division of labor and clearly contributed to the deindustrialization of advanced economies. In terms of its distributional effects, offshoring heightens inequality not only by substituting American workers for foreign workers, but also by yielding substantial labor-cost savings, which then manifest as higher incomes for corporations and their elite workers. This latter effect boosts top incomes but the former effect depresses middle and lower incomes. Indeed, studies of advanced capitalist countries link offshoring with rising income inequality (Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Kollmeyer 2015) and with sluggish wage growth for the working class (Kollmeyer 2017 ).
3. Interaction Effect
This study's main argument is that trade union decline, occurring within the context of deindustrialization and enhanced capital mobility, creates more profound distributional effects than these factors would create in isolation. In this sense, the steady upswing in US income inequality can be understood as arising not just from institutional change and not just from structural economic change, but from the combination of the two. Conceptually, this implies that deunionization and structural economic change shape the income distribution through an interaction effect. In making this claim, I portray the distributional effects of trade unionism as arising from a moderated causal process, in which an otherwise straightforward bivariate relationship (trade unionism's effect on income inequality) is altered by a third variable (structural economic change).
The hypothesized interaction effect starts from a dualism between unionized industrial workers and non-unionized service-sector workers. On the topic of labor market dualism, Kuznets (1955) famously argued that industrialization initially pushes inequality higher because it shifts employment out of the traditional sector (where wages are uniformly low) into the modern sector (where wages are typically higher). At first, this process exacerbates inequality due to pronounced earnings differences between the traditional and modern sectors. But as the transformation continues and most people become employed in the modern sector, inequality stabilizes and eventually falls as the process continues toward completion. Related to my study, Kuznets' theory highlights how shifting employment patterns can alter the national income distribution, especially when the sectors have different earnings dynamics.
Extending this idea, contemporary sociologists argue that recent employment shifts from the industrial sector (with low wage dispersion) to the service sector (with high wage dispersion) heighten income inequality (Kwon 2014 (Kwon , 2016 Rohrback 2009 ). For example, Kwon (2016) maintains that a Kuznetsian dynamic is increasing inequality in the United States, because the expanding service sector exhibits substantial wage dispersion, arising from the diverging fortunes of high-earning knowledge workers and low-earning personal service workers (see also Moller & Rubin 2008) . I agree with this account of income inequality, but additionally I ask whether changing employment patterns are intertwined with declining unionization rates in ways that exacerbate inequality.
Indeed, I believe this to be the case. Over recent decades, the fortunes of less-skilled workers have deteriorated as their employment opportunities shift from unionized jobs in the industrial sector (high-wage, secure employment) toward non-unionized jobs in the service sector (low-wage, insecure employment).
This transformation should widen inequality between the working class and the affluent, but its distributional effects may be more complex than they appear. This is the case, I argue, because deindustrialization and the offshoring of routine production processes not only eliminate good unionized jobs, but they weaken the bargaining power of organized labor more generally. This latter outcome suggests the presence of an interaction effect.
Several factors underpin the proposed interaction effect. One factor is that deindustrialization upended the structural conditions upon which successful trade unionism developed (Bluestone & Harrison 1982; Craver 1995; Troy 1986; Rosenfeld 2014) . Historically, the American labor movement predominated in the Northeast and Midwest, where leading industrial firms used Fordist production techniques and employed sizeable workforces in large factory settings. These structural conditions proved conducive to labor organizing. But as deindustrialization proceeded and the remaining manufacturing firms substituted advanced equipment for less-skilled labor, American industry not only shrank in size but changed qualitatively (Whitford 2005) . Especially in manufacturing, worksites became smaller, production techniques more flexible, and workforces more skilled. Manufacturing firms also gravitated toward the South and West, where unions typically enjoy less political and public support. Indeed, empirical research links these structural changes to the declining ability of trade unions to organize new workplaces (Wallace, Fullerton, & Gurbuz 2009 ).
Moreover, deindustrialization and offshoring leave trade unions in the industrial sector with less bargaining power. This occurs because industrial sector retrenchment undermines the ability of trade unions to confront their employers and collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions (Bluestone & Harrisons 1982) . If industrial workers are plentiful but industrial jobs are scarce, and if manufacturing firms can relocate their production activities to LDCs, the balance of bargaining power clearly shifts away from organized labor. Under such conditions, trade unions struggle to secure wage increases, but sometimes even acquiesce to wage concessions or targeted job losses as a means of retaining scarce capital investment (Herod 1994; Sallaz 2004) . In other words, the shrinking pool of capital investment puts industrial-sector trade unions on the back foot, causing them to prioritize saving jobs over increasing wages. In this way, industrial restructuring and its related processes weaken the bargaining power of trade unions and lessen their ability to redistribute income and lower inequality.
Notably, this trend is reinforced by the inability of trade unions to gain a substantial foothold in the expanding service sector. As Lipset & Katchanovski (2001) point out, the service sector presents trade unions with difficult conditions for organizing and collectively bargaining (Dølvik & Waddington 2004) . Unlike the industrial sector of the post-war period, service sector worksites are typically small and geographically dispersed, and workforces are fragmented by high turnover rates and non-standard employment practices (Weil 2014 ). Under such conditions, trade unions struggle to build solidarity, unite workers, and engage in collective action. This outcome not only lowers union densities, but it also hinders the ability of trade unions to function on behalf of their members. In sum, I contend that deindustrialization and the related process of offshoring intensify the distributional consequences of trade union decline, creating a situation in which the combined effect of these phenomena is greater than their individual effects would otherwise be.
OTHER DISTRIBUTIONAL FACTORS
1. Neoliberalism and Macroeconomic Factors
Although my analysis focuses on the interplay between deindustrialization, offshoring, and trade union decline, I control for other factors that may affect the nation income distribution. Here, changes in macroeconomic conditions associated with the demise of Keynesianism and the rise of neoliberalism merit consideration. During the heyday of Keynesianism, pro-labor political forces pursued full employment as a key policy objective, because as Kalecki (1943) famously argued, full employment not only provides jobs for the unemployed, but shifts the entire balance of class power in favor of the working class (see also Glyn 1995) . Inflation, however, is a different matter. Although high levels of inflation are problematic in many ways, incremental increases from modest levels may lessen inequality (Mocan 1999) . This can happen because inflation is particularly harmful to the wealthy, especially those holding inflation-sensitive assets, but also because inflation is positively associated with workers' bargaining power (Hung & Thompson 2016) .
Crucially, US government policy toward unemployment and inflation changed significantly over the period examined in this study. Under Keynesianism, full employment was pursued and modest inflation tolerated, but under neoliberalism, the situation reversed. As Harvey (2007:23-25) notes, the "Volker shock" of 1979-80 signed a historic transformation in US monetary policy, essentially switching from a pursuit of low unemployment to a pursuit of low inflation. This policy transformation reflected and reinforced a change in the balance of class power, which moving it away from workers and toward capital (Hung & Thompson 2016) . Hence, for my study, I expect unemployment to heighten inequality, but inflation to lower it. This expectation is in line with both Keynesian and neoliberal thinking.
2. Technological Change and Education
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is the dominant explanation for rising income inequality in economics (Autor 2014 However, for at least two reasons, the distributional effects of SBTC may be less pronounced than originally thought. First, as Autor and his colleagues (2003) note, computer-driven technologies often displace workers performing routine tasks, but routine tasks are not limited to working-class occupations. In fact, they are most concentrated in semi-skilled occupations. For example, computers cannot (yet) perform the task of driving trucks or forklifts (lower-skilled, blue-collar work), but they can perform tasks previously undertaken by bank tellers, loan officers, bookkeepers, and tax preparers (semi-skilled, white-collar work). In fact, recent research suggests that middle-income jobs are the most susceptible to displacement by computerization (Autor, Katz, & Kearney 2008) . This conclusion dovetails with sociological depictions of the "hourglass" economy, wherein job growth disproportionately occurs among low-and high-paying occupations (Massey & Hirst 1998) . Given the diffuse distributional effects of SBTC, it is unsurprising that some studies find weak links between computerization and rising income inequality (Kim & Sakamoto 2010; Kristal & Cohen 2016; cf. Liu & Grusky 2013 ).
Second, the distributional effects of SBTC must be considered in tandem with educational outcomes. As described by Goldin and Katz (2008) , US income inequality is shaped by a "race" between technological advancement on one hand and educational achievements on the other (see also Autor 2014) . Technological change generally heightens inequality by creating shortages of high-skilled workers who can use emergent technologies, but such skill shortages can be overcome when workforces become better educated. Indeed, this has long happened in the United States. In the late 1940s, about four percent of American adults had university degrees, but that figure is nearly 30 percent today (US Census Bureau 2017b.)
Importantly, improved educational outcomes should offset the disequalizing effect on SBTC. In sum, I expect that computerization plays only a modest role in explaining changes in the national income distribution.
Financialization
Financialization is another factor to consider. On this subject, Tomaskovic- (using profits to fund business expansion) to "downsize and distribute" (cutting jobs to free income for shareholders). To implement this strategy, effected firms downsized their workforces, ridding themselves especially of lower-skilled workers whose jobs could be off-shored, outsourced, or automated (Peters 2011) . In sum, I expect financialization to affect both the top and bottom portions of the income distribution.
4. Other Structural Factors
Public sector retrenchment should push inequality higher. On this subject, I also control for technological change, but this more difficult to measure. Corrado and Hulten (2010) ask "how do you measure a technological revolution" when its effects are multi-facetted and diffuse? Their question is apt, but they offer little practical advice for researchers. Acknowledging these difficulties, I note that the distributional effects of SBTC not only reflect technological change (which heightens demand for high-skilled workers), but also improvements in educational outcomes (which heightens the supply of high-skilled workers) (see Goldin & Katz 2008 Nonetheless, to deal with these issues, I use the Prais-Winsten estimation procedure with Huber-White standard errors.
DATA AND METHODS
To test my explanations for rising income inequality in the United
Lastly, given the time-series data, I consider whether the distributional effects of my independent variables unfold over multiple years or occur contemporaneously (Beck 1991; Wooldridge 2012: Chapter 18) . The former outcome can be modelled with a "finite distributed-lag" specification, in which independent variables appear in both contemporaneous and lagged forms. I experiment with this technique, but I find no evidence of lagged effects. Hence, I
use contemporaneous specification for all of my variables. Finally, to aid interpret of relative effects, I convert my variables to z-scores. This facilitates direct comparison of the parameter estimates, because now all variables share the same unit of measure (i.e. standard deviations from the mean). Table 1 begins by developing the main effects model of change in the US Gini coefficient between 1947 and 2015. To highlight the hypothesized interaction effects, I develop the main effects model in a stepwise fashion but exclude the control variables for now. To start the analysis, Model 1 shows the isolated effect of union density on income inequality, which is found to be negative, strong and highly significant. This finding is consistent with the power resource theory of trade unionism. Yet, when industrial employment and imports from LDCs are added to this bivariate model, the effect of union density declines by nearly twothirds and becomes statistically insignificant (see Model 2) . This reflects, I believe, the failure of this model to include the interaction effects I propose in Section 2.3.
RESULTS
1 Main effects model
Indeed, this appears to be the case. When an interaction term is added in Model 3, all the variables involved in the interaction effect become highly significant and exhibit the expected signs. In particular, the coefficient for the interaction between union density and industrial employment is negative and relatively large, suggesting that the distributional consequences of deindustrialization and deunionization primarily arise from a moderated effect.
Likewise, Model 4 suggests a similar outcome with the offshoring of routineproduction jobs. Here, as expected, the coefficient is positive rather than negative, because unlike rising industrial employment, rising imports from LDCs should push inequality higher. Consequently, the expected sign is positive. Shown in the appendix, I also test whether similar interactions adhere between trade union decline and public sector retrenchment, but find no evidence to support this idea (see Table A1 ). Figure 2 illustrates the importance of the interaction effects. Here, predicted and actual values of the Gini coefficient are compared after converting the variables from first differences to levels and re-estimating Models 2 and 4.
Clearly, the model with interaction effects more accurately captures the steep upward rise of income inequality, which transpired over several decades even though the sharpest fall in union density occurred between the late 1970s and mid1980s. Overall, the evidence presented in Figure 2 and Table 1 support the notion that deunionization, deindustrialization, and offshoring interact in ways that push inequality higher.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here.]
Next, Table 2 Since all variables are measured in z-scores, parameter estimates can be directly compared, with the largest estimates (in absolute terms) representing the largest effects. In this regard, the largest effects are associated with my interaction terms, and the smallest effect with the ICT stock / university educated variable.
This latter variable captures the distributional consequences of the "race between technology and education," although proponents of this argument claim it is difficult to measure (Corrado & Hulten 2010) . While my findings contradict the original SBTC framework and may reflect measurement error, they resonate with sociological research questioning the degree to which recent technological change drives inequality (see Kim & Sakamoto 2010; Kristal & Cohen 2016) . Indeed, none of my models support the SBTC argument.
[Insert Table 2 This idea is consistent with sociological research describing the emergence of an "hourglass economy" (Massey & Hirst 1998) fuelled by the proliferation of "bad jobs" (Kalleberg 2009 (Kalleberg , 2011 as well as economic research finding that middleincome earners are the greatest beneficiaries of unionization (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux 2009: 962-966) .
Lastly, several findings related to the control variables are worth noting. In addition to power-resource theory, this study considers the "insideroutsider" perspective of trade unionism (see Rueda 2007) . It is possible that, as technological change and outsourcing whittle away routine production jobs, the loss of unionized industrial employment disproportionately affects low-and semiskilled workers. If this occurs, contemporary trade unions should represent more skilled workers, potentially transforming them into a social force for inequality among the working class. To examine this idea, I model change in the 50 th /20 th income ratio, but find little evidence of an "insider-outsider" dynamic altering this part of the income distribution. Instead, the market-institutional factors examined here seem to erode "insider-outsider" dynamics. This likely occurs because deindustrialization, and especially the threat of offshoring, reduces the ability of unionized industrial workers to bargain for higher wages, causing their incomes to fall toward those of labor-market "outsiders." This finding is consistent with sociological conceptions of an "hourglass economy" (Massey & Hirst 1998) , brought about by the proliferation of "bad jobs" (Kalleberg 2009 (Kalleberg , 2011 , and with economic research showing unionization benefiting middle-income earners the most (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux 2009: 962-966) .
I raise three more issues. My study highlights the importance of the fullemployment economy as a policy mechanism for reducing inequality. The demise of Keynesianism and the rise of neoliberalism changed the macroeconomic priorities of US policymakers, moving them away from a concern with unemployment toward a concern with inflation. This policy shift partially reflects the exigencies of globalization, in particular the growing power of mobile capital, which cares greatly about sound money but much less about joblessness. By linking neoliberalism with changing macroeconomic outcomes, my study illustrates useful ways to gain analytical leverage on questions concerning neoliberalism and inequality. This could create fruitful lines of enquiry for those interested in melding economic, political, and sociological accounts of inequality.
My study also contributes to debates on skill-biased technological change.
Clearly, the Information Revolution altered the American workplace, and clearly many of these changes have distributional consequences, but it does not necessarily follow that technological change altered inequality at the aggregate level. It is my contention that the lack of support for the SBTC theory, both here and elsewhere, reflects the fact that computer-driven technological change often generates offsetting and cross-cutting distributional effects, because it reduces demand for workers across a broad range of occupational categories. When these disparate effects are aggregated, the cumulative effect is attenuated. Furthermore, it is important to note that technological change can reduce labor's share of national income, as Kristal (2013) shows, even though its overall effect among American workers is modest.
Lastly, I consider whether my findings would hold in other advanced capitalist countries. To assess this question, one must recall that the proposed interaction effects arise when structural economic change deunionizes large swaths of the workforce, and undermines the power of remaining trade unions. While deindustrialization, capital mobility, and service sector expansion complicate matters for trade unions everywhere (Dølvik & Waddington 2004) , trade unions in Western Europe have more effectively navigated this new economic environment. This is the case partially because trade unions in Europe benefit from structural features absent from the US political economy-for example, centralized wage bargaining, policy concertation, left-labor party support, and codetermination.
These supports help them to retain bargaining and organizational power, even when their membership rolls decline. Hence, I suspect that my argument is most applicable to the United States, but more research could help settle this question. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. All variables converted to zscores. Full battery of control variables included but not reported. * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01.
